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Abstract
In a recent paper in this journal, Derek Baker (Erkenntnis 83(4):829–852, 2018) 
raises an objection to expressivism as it has been developed by  Mark Schroeder 
(Being for, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Baker argues that Schroeder’s 
expressivist (1) is committed to certain sentences expressing rationally incoherent 
states of mind, and he objects (2) that the expressivist cannot explain why these 
states would be rationally incoherent. The aim of this paper is to show that Bak-
er’s argument for (1) is unsound, and that (1) is unlikely to be true. This obviates 
the need to explain the alleged rational incoherence, and so Baker’s objection to 
Schroeder’s expressivism is undermined.
1 Introduction
In his paper ‘Expression and Guidance in Schroeder’s Expressivist Semantics’ 
(2018) Derek Baker raises an objection to expressivism as it has been developed by 
Mark Schroeder in his book  ‘Being For’ (2008). The objection is based on a par-
ticular argument. Baker argues that if the view Schroeder developed on behalf of 
expressivism is true, then the following sentence “must be expressing inconsistent 
psychological commitments” or an “inconsistent state of mind” (2018, p. 838):
(S) ‘Murder is wrong, but not blaming for murder makes sense’.
So Baker’s argument is supposed to establish the claim (henceforth: Baker’s claim) 
that the mental state expressed by (S) is, as I prefer to say, rationally incoherent,1 
and his objection is based on that claim.
 * Sebastian Hengst 
 herrhengst@web.de
1 Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP), University of Munich (LMU), 
Ludwigstraße 31, 80539 Munich, Germany
1 For the purpose of this paper, I shall stipulate that a mental state or set of mental states is rationally 
incoherent iff by simultaneously holding these states an agent violates some requirement of rationality.
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Baker’s objection to Schroeder’s expressivism is not that the above sentence 
(S) intuitively does not express a rationally incoherent mental state.2 Rather Baker 
accepts the incoherence and objects that Schroeder’s expressivism is unable to 
explain the rational incoherence of the state expressed by (S), at least without raising 
serious problems elsewhere in the expressivist theory.
The aim of this paper is to show that Baker’s argument is unsound, and so does 
not establish Baker’s claim about the incoherence of the state expressed by (S). 
Moreover, I shall argue that even more promising arguments for that claim also fail 
and so it is unlikely that the state expressed by (S) is rationally incoherent. But if 
Baker’s claim is false, this undermines his objection to expressivism: one cannot 
object to expressivism that it is unable to explain why a state is rationally incoher-
ent, when in fact it is not rationally incoherent.
2  Baker’s Objection and Schroeder’s Expressivism
Let us start by taking a closer look at Baker’s objection and Schroeder’s expres-
sivism. On Baker’s understanding, (S) is a conjunction of two atomic first-order 
language sentences. The first conjunct, ‘murder is wrong’, contains the normative 
predicate ‘wrong’ applied to ‘murder’. The second conjunct, ‘not blaming for mur-
der makes sense’, contains the normative predicate ‘makes sense’ applied to ‘not 
blaming for murder’.3 Baker primarily, though not exclusively, uses ‘makes sense’ in 
his paper as the normative predicate in the second conjunct, but he suggests that it 
could be replaced by ‘is the thing to do’, ‘is rational’, ‘is reasonable’, ‘is fitting’, ‘is 
appropriate’, or ‘one ought to’.4
The heart of Schroeder’s metaethical expressivism is a formal semantics for a 
first-order language containing moral or normative predicates like ‘wrong’. This 
expressivist semantics provides a recursive mapping from every sentence of the 
3 I think we should not treat ‘not blaming for murder’ (or ‘notblamingformurder’) as a singular term in 
a formal first-order language. At least, we must be aware that if we treat it as a singular term, then the 
alledged rational failure of believing that notblamingformurder makes sense while also believing that 
blamingformurder makes sense cannot be explained by the logical meaning of ‘not’, since ‘not’ does 
not contribute to the meaning of the term ‘notblamingformurder’ in the usual way. But if ‘not blaming 
for murder’ is not a singular term, this is a problem for Baker’s objection, because his whole discussion 
assumes that ‘makes sense’ functions like a predicate in order to be able to use Schroeder’s semantic 
clause for atomic formulas (see below). I will ignore this problem, because I am primarily concerned 
with Baker’s argument, not with his objection, and the argument does not require that ‘makes sense’ is a 
predicate.
4 Standard semantic theorizing treats ‘ought’ as a deontic modal understood as a sentential operator. 
Baker cannot treat either ‘makes sense’ or ‘ought’ as a modal however, because Schroeder’s semantics 
does not contain a semantic clause for deontic modals, and so Baker cannot use such a clause to con-
struct (U) below.
2 This is surprising, because Baker, I think correctly, says that “the claim is not that the utterance ‘Mur-
der is wrong, but one ought not to blame for murder’ sounds infelicitous; I am happy to acknowledge 
it does not” (Baker 2018, p. 838). Baker suggested to me (in personal communication) that despite its 
felicity (S) may nevertheless express an incoherent state, but that the incoherence need not be obvious. 
However, if the expressed incoherence is non-obvious, this clearly shifts the burden on Baker to provide 
a convincing argument for the incoherence which, if my arguments in this paper are correct, he has not 
done.
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language to the mental state it expresses. Schroeder stipulates that in his particular 
form of expressivist semantics, all sentences express noncognitive states of being 
for, even non-normative sentences, since he believes that otherwise expressivists 
will not be able to provide a constructive solution to the Frege–Geach problem.5 
Being for is supposed to be a noncognitive, desire-like, motivational state that takes 
complex mental properties as its content. For atomic sentences, Schroeder offers the 
following semantic clause:
Atom For every predicate F and singular term t, sentences of the form F(t) 
express for((t)) , where (t) is a complex property one is for having, namely the 
property of standing in the -relation to t.6
Schroeder suggests that ‘t is wrong’ expresses being for blaming t, or slightly more 
formally: for(blaming(t)). The sentence ‘murdering is wrong’ then expresses the 
state of being for blaming murdering. Since, as a quasi-realist, Schroeder’s expres-
sivist will hold that to believe what a sentence says is to be in the state expressed by 
it, it follows that to believe that murder is wrong is to be for blaming murder, and 
likewise for all other beliefs.
Another important stipulation of Schroeder’s theory is that being for is capable 
of what he calls A-type inconsistency: A set of mental states is A-type inconsistent 
iff the states are all of the same genus (e. g. belief, intention, or being for...) and 
the set of states is rationally incoherent if their contents are (logically) inconsist-
ent. It follows, that a set of states of being for is rationally incoherent if their con-
tents are (logically) inconsistent. This implies that for( ) is rationally incoherent 
with for(¬ ), where  is a schematic letter standing for an arbitrary metalanguage 
formula describing a property one is for having. It is natural to reformulate A-type 
inconsistency as a requirement of rationality: rationality requires that one is not 
being for (logically) inconsistent contents (cf. No Contradictory Being Fors below). 
It follows from my definition of rational incoherence as violation of a rationality 
requirement that being for inconsistent contents is one way of being rationally inco-
herent, but it need not be the only way.7
5 For more on Schroeder’s notion of constructiveness see footnote 7.
6 Cf. Schroeder (2008, p. 78). I follow Schroeder in using small caps to denote mental states, but I also 
write ‘belief’ and ‘being for’ to preserve better readability. For simplicity I ignore that only closed sen-
tences express states, and I also ignore Schroeder’s use of -abstractions in the metalanguage.
7 An anonymous reviewer objects that I do not make clear what should count as rational incoherence. 
This is incorrect, I do so in footnote 1, where I say that any violation of a rational requirement gives rise 
to rational incoherence. Since I think Schroeder’s A-type inconsistency, as well as what he calls B-type 
inconsistency [for these notions see Schroeder (2008, p. 43/48)], are classifications of types of require-
ments of rationality, it follows from my definition of rational incoherence that any way of being A- or 
B-type inconsistent is a way of being rationally incoherent. For instance, if it is a requirement of ration-
ality that one is not being for something while also being against it (which would be a form of B-type 
inconsistency), then violating this requirement makes one rationally incoherent. The same holds for all 
other requirements of rationality, such as Enkrasia, No Contradictory Intentions, or Means-End-Coher-
ence etc.
 The same reviewer criticizes that I do not mention that Schroeder and Baker [in joint work with Woods 
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Baker here uses  as a placeholder, because Schroeder’s semantics does not include 
a lexical entry for the predicate ‘makes sense’.
Now, if Baker’s claim is correct, which says that the state that is expressed by 
(S) must be an incoherent or inconsistent state of mind, and Schroeder’s theory says 
that (U) is the state expressed by (S), then (U) must be an inconsistent state of mind. 
This raises the question: “does Schroeder’s theory predict an inconsistent state of 
mind?” (Baker 2018, p. 838).
The answer to this will obviously depend on what  is, and the largest part of 
Baker’s paper is concerned with the question of whether ‘  ’ can be replaced with 
something that allows Schroeder to predict the rational incoherence of (U). In 
fact, Baker thinks there are ways to predict the incoherence (for instance, if ‘  ’ 
is replaced with ‘being for’). But he argues that every replacement that allows 
Schroeder to predict the incoherence creates problems elsewhere in the expressivist 
theory (e. g. having to do with the inexpressibility of some states). So his objection 
is that, ultimately, expressivists are unable to explain the incoherence.
I think that expressivists could say some things in reply to Baker’s various 
replacements of ‘  ’. But it is unnecessary that I go into the downstream details of 
Baker’s objection here, since I want to suggest that Baker’s claim about incoherence 
is false anyway. I do so by showing that Baker’s argument for the claim is unsound 
Footnote 7 (continued)
(Baker and Woods 2015)] disagree about how expressivists can and should explain logical relations 
such as logical inconsistency between sentences in terms of the rational relations between the states they 
express. In my view, all sides agree that expressivists want to be able to say that a set of sentences is 
logically inconsistent iff the rational incoherence between the states expressed by them survives substitu-
tions. But Schroeder believes, whereas Baker and Woods do not, that expressivists can quarantee that 
rational incoherence survives substitutions in a constructive and non-ad hoc way, only if they appeal to 
forms of rational incoherence which are due to relations between the contents of states (A-type incon-
sistency), and not due to relations between types of states (B-type), because he thinks B-type accounts 
can not be generalized. [Schroeder (2015b) seems to think expressivists can have a constructive higher-
order account without requiring A-type inconsistency. For Schroeder’s notion of constructiveness see for 
instance his Schroeder (2010, p. 133) or the précis to a PEA-soup discussion (Paakkunainen 2015)]. It is 
not totally clear whether Baker and Woods disagree with Schroeder’s idea that all such explanations need 
to be constructive, or if they disagree with the idea that constructiveness can be accieved only by appeal 
to A-type inconsistency. But whatever their disagreement ultimately consists of, I must admit that I do 
not see why this debate should have any bearing on the issue being explored in Baker’s paper to which 
my paper is a response. Whether or not expressivists can or should explain logical inconsistency by 
appeal to specific forms of rational incoherence, such as A-type inconsistency, does not tell us which fur-
ther requirements of rationality expressivists should accept, which is the topic of this and Baker’s paper. 
In particular it does not imply that they should accept the principles which Baker needs in order to make 
his argument against Schroeder (e. g. Forcia or Direct Enkrasia below). The debate about how expressiv-
ists can account for logic, even though they do so by appealing to rational incoherence, is orthogonal to 
the issue discussed here.
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(Sect. 3), and that better arguments for it can and should be resisted by Schroeder’s 
expressivist (Sect. 4). This undermines Baker’s objection to expressivism, because if 
there is no incoherence to be explained in the first place, then it cannot be objected 
that expressivism is unable to explain said incoherence.8
3  Baker’s Argument for Incoherence
Why does Baker think that the sentence ‘murder is wrong, but not blaming for mur-
der makes sense’ must express a rationally incoherent mental state? He offers the 
following argument:
the agent who utters the above sentence [(S)] is expressing a commitment [...] 
to blame for murder, while simultaneously the same agent judges it makes 
sense not to blame for murder—and since ‘makes sense’ is normative, she 
must also be expressing a commitment not to blame for murder. So it seems 
like we should want to say that ‘Murder is wrong but not blaming for murder 
makes sense’ is semantically incompetent or she is irrational—she’s commit-
ting to doing something and simultaneously committing to not doing it. (Baker 
2018, p. 837, italics original)
Here is another version of the argument:
We can put the point this way: either the agent does not blame for murder, 
in which case she fails to have an attitude she is committed to having; or she 
blames, in which case her emotions don’t conform with her own better judg-
ment, her judgment about which reaction would make the most sense. So she 
is guilty of inconsistency in her psychological commitments. (Baker 2018, p. 
838)
This argument relies on two principles. The first is:
it seems like an implicit commitment about the nature of the being-for atti-
tude is that failing to have the target attitudes that one is for having is a fail-
ing of rational coherence. Presumably it was always part of the story that an 
agent who is for blaming for murder but does not in fact blame for murder is 
guilty of irrationality (all else being equal). (Baker 2018, p. 843)
I shall reformulate this as a requirement of rationality, and call it:
Forcia: Rationality requires: if one is for( ), then one is .
8 In other words, Baker argues that expressivists who walk the path proposed by Schroeder are com-
mitted to the claim that (S) expresses a rationally incoherent mental state, but are unable to explain why 
this would be so. The main goal of this paper is to show that Baker’s argument for the incoherence of 
the state expressed by (S) is unsound, and that it is unlikely that the state expressed by (S) is incoherent. 
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for urging me to be clearer on the dialectic.
 S. Hengst 
1 3
The argument also relies on a second principle which is:
[There] is the widespread intuition that an agent who sincerely judges that 
something is the thing to do will be motivated to do it, barring weakness 
of will or other forms of defective agency. Someone who judges that some 
feeling is the one that makes sense suffers from a case of irrationality (of 
recalcitrant emotion) if they do not in fact feel it. (Baker 2018, p. 837)
Applied to his second conjunct he says:
If I judge ‘Not blaming for murder makes sense,’ what this judgment should 
intuitively regulate is my attitude of blame (or my lack of such an attitude). 
If I continue to blame for murder, I am acting, by my lights, irrationally. ... 
[that judgment] does rule out the rational coherence of continuing to blame 
for murder. (Baker 2018, p. 839)
We can also reformulate this as a requirement of rationality, and call it, follow-
ing Broome (2013):
Direct Enkrasia: Rationality requires that if one believes one ought to ¬ , then 
one is ¬.
Two points on my reformulation of Baker. First, Direct Enkrasia is formulated 
in terms of ‘ought’, instead of ‘makes sense’ or ‘is the thing to do’, because this 
is the way Enkrasia (see below) is standardly formulated. This should be fine 
for Baker, since he explicitly “treat[s] ‘One ought to x’ as equivalent to ‘x-ing 
makes sense’ or ‘x-ing is reasonable’.” (Baker 2018, p. 831). Second, in the quote 
above Baker says that someone who jugdes that something is the thing to do will 
be motivated to do it. My reformulation does not mention motivation because, 
if instead of Direct Enkrasia we interpret Baker as saying that it is rationally 
required that if one believes one ought to ¬ , then one is motivated to ¬ , then 
Baker’s argument will become invalid.
So here is Baker’s argument in a more explicit form:
Forcia: Rationality requires that if one is being for  , then one is .
Direct Enkrasia: Rationality requires that if one believes one ought to ¬ , then 
one is ¬.
Corollary: one necessarily violates a requirement of rationality (i. e. one is ration-
ally incoherent) if one is for  and believes one ought to ¬.
Belief as Being For: believing that t is wrong is being for blaming for t.
Baker’s Claim: Hence, one necessarily violates some requirement of rationality 
if one believes that t is wrong and believes that one ought not blame for t. (From 
Corollary, Belief as Being For, and substitution of  with ‘blaming for t’)
This argument is valid. It is impossible to satisfy both Forcia and Direct Enkrasia, 
if one believes one ought to ¬ while also being for  , which means that one cannot 
be in both states and be fully rationally coherent. By replacing  with ‘blaming for 
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t’, we get that it is rationally incoherent to believe one ought not to blame for t while 
also being for blaming for t. Since, according to Schroeder’s noncognitivist ‘analysis 
of belief’ (Belief as Being For), being for blaming for t is believing that t is wrong, it 
follows that the belief that t is wrong is rationally incoherent with the belief that one 
ought not blame for t. Hence, Baker’s argument entails his claim about incoherence.
Even though Baker’s argument is valid, it is not sound. Contrary to what Baker 
assumes, Schroeder’s expressivist does not, need not, and must not accept either For-
cia or Direct Enkrasia. I shall argue for each of these claims in turn.
Schroeder’s expressivist does not assume Forcia, at least not explicitly. Schroeder 
nowhere in his book or his papers9 assumes “that an agent who is for blaming for 
murder but does not in fact blame for murder is guilty of irrationality (all else being 
equal)” (Baker 2018, p. 843). What Schroeder does assume instead is “that being 
for has the motivational property that someone who is for( ) will tend to do  , all 
else being equal” (Schroeder 2008, p. 93). This is neither formulated as nor intended 
to be a requirement of rationality.10 Since Schroeder’s expressivist does not assume 
Forcia, she is not committed to accepting Baker’s argument.11
Schroeder’s expressivist does not assume Direct Enkrasia either, at least not 
explicitly. This again shows that Schroeder’s expressivist, as he currently formulated 
the view, need not accept Baker’s argument.
Schroeder also does not implicitly assume Forcia or Direct Enkrasia, because his 
theory does not need these principles. Neither of them plays a theoretical role in his 
theory. The only principle Schroeder actually needs in order to establish his results 
especially about logic is A-type inconsistency.
Perhaps Schroeder would have to assume additional requirements besides A-type 
inconsistency, if he wanted to explain not only logic, but also how it is possible that 
certain requirements of rationality (e. g. Enkrasia) hold, if normative beliefs really 
are noncognitive states of being for. But whatever additional requirements expres-
sivists need in order to explain some widely accepted requirements, they must not 
accept either Forcia or Direct Enkrasia, since they are false, or so I shall argue now.
Direct Enkrasia is false. Rationality does not require that rational agents succeed 
in doing what they believe they ought to do. Rational agents may be omniscient, 
but they need not be omnipotent. That one sometimes fails to do what one believes 
one ought to do, does not make one irrational, because it is sometimes, in fact often, 
beyond our control to secure that we succeed in doing what we believe we ought to 
do. This line of argument is rooted in the widely accepted principle that rationality 
supervenes on the mind.12
Direct Enkrasia will be compatible with the supervenience principle, and may 
in fact sound more plausible, if it is restricted to  ’s that are not actions or states 
12 See for instance Broome (2013, p. 89), Kiesewetter (2017) and Wedgwood (2017).
9 A collection of some of Schroeder’s papers on expressivism can be found in his volume (Schroeder 
2015a).
10 Even if it were formulated as a requirement, it would require only that one tends to do  , not that one 
does  , which is what Baker’s argument needs.
11 As a reviewer correctly points out, Schroeder’s expressivist might be committed to Baker’s claim even 
if he does not assume Forcia, and even if Baker’s argument is unsound. It is for precisely this reason that 
I discuss and reject other possible arguments for the incoherence below.
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of the world, but mental states. It has, however, been convincingly argued by John 
Broome that “we have to reject the Direct Enkratic Condition, even restriced to 
mental states. Its apparent attraction is spurious, and the counterexamples show it is 
false” (Broome 2013, p. 96).13
Similar points can be made about Forcia. If Forcia is not restricted to mental 
states, then it violates the supervenience constraint for rational requirements. One 
cannot be accused of irrationality just because one fails to succeed to do what one is 
for doing. Bad luck is not the same as bad reason. But even if Forcia is restricted to 
mental states, it seems false.14 Toppinen, to whose paper Baker refers in a footnote, 
argues against ‘Schroeder-style views’ that there is “no appropriate rational con-
nection, at all, between desiring to desire  and the desire to  ”, and likewise that 
“it is possible for me to be fully rational, to be for desiring  , and yet not to desire 
to  ” (Toppinen 2015,  p. 160f.; italics original). Moreover, Baker himself should 
be sceptical about Forcia, given that he says about desire that “it is an open ques-
tion whether there is any breakdown in rational coherence in failing to have an atti-
tude one desires to have” (Baker 2018, p. 840). I do not see why this should be any 
different in the case of being for. Hence, Forcia is not plausibly a requirement of 
rationality.
To summarize: Schroeder’s expressivism does not assume Forcia or Direct 
Enkrasia. Moreover, Schroeder does not need to assume these principles in order 
to establish the results of his expressivist semantics and logic. And more impor-
tantly, these principles must not play a role in his theory, since they do not appear 
to be requirements of rationality at all. So I conclude that, since either of the crucial 
premises of Baker’s argument is false, the argument does not establish the truth of 
his claim about incoherence.
4  Better Arguments for Incoherence?
In the previous section I showed that Baker’s argument for incoherence is unsound. 
But showing that an argument is unsound, does not show that its conclusion is false. 
So might Baker’s claim nevertheless be true? In this section I offer some better argu-
ments for Baker’s claim of incoherence, but show that even these better arguments 
can and should be resisted by expressivists. Here is another argument:
No Contradictory Intentions: Rationality requires that if one intends  , then one 
does not intend ¬.
Enkrasia: Rationality requires that if one believes one ought ¬ , then one intends 
¬.
13 For discussion of (Restricted) Direct Enkrasia and the counterexamples see Broome (2013, Ch. 6) 
who concludes that “Versions of Direct Enkrasia have an initial appeal, but they are no real alternative to 
Enkrasia itself” (Broome 2013, p. 173).
14 Baker’s talk of ‘emotions’, ‘feelings’ and ‘attitudes’ in the above quotes clearly suggests that he 
implicitly restricts Forcia to mental states. But it is not clear that in the case of being for blaming for 
murder, blaming is a mental state, or that it could not be replaced by actions like sanctioning, punishing, 
or outlawing.
1 3
Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality: Reply to Baker 
Corollary: One necessarily violates a requirement, if one intends  while believ-
ing one ought ¬.
Belief as Intention: Believing that t is wrong is intending to blame for t.15
Baker’s Claim: it is necessarily rationally incoherent to believe that t is wrong 
while believing that one ought not blame for t.
This is valid. No Contradictory Intentions and Enkrasia cannot jointly be satisfied, 
if their antecedents are true, because their consequents are inconsistent (Corollary). 
What we need in order to derive Baker’s claim from this is the additional noncogni-
tivist premise which says that to hold a moral belief is to intend something (Belief 
as Intention). This premise is Schroeder’s Belief as Being For, simply with ‘being 
for’ being replaced by ‘intention’. Baker’s claim then follows straightforwardly from 
Corollary, Belief as Intention, and by substituting ‘blame for t’ into ‘ ’.
This argument is better than Baker’s original one, because it relies on the widely 
accepted requirements No Contradictory Intentions and Enkrasia.16 I will not debate 
their truth here, and simply assume that expressivists accept them for the sake of 
argument. But even when Schroeder’s expressivist accepts these as requirements, 
the argument has an obvious flaw: Schroeder does not accept Belief as Intention, but 
Belief as Being For. So, this argument does not apply to Schroeder’s expressivism as 
it is currently formulated.
So is Schroeder’s expressivism safe from this new argument? One might think 
that there are two problems, both deriving from the fact that being for and intention 
share some of their main features.
Here is the first problem. What is important about the being for attitude is that it 
is a noncognitive, desire-like motivational pro-attitude that is rationally incoherent 
to hold towards inconsistent contents. But these characteristics  seem to be true of 
intention as well. This suggests that Schroeder could perhaps have formulated his 
theory in terms of intention, instead of being for. If he did, he would accept Belief as 
Intention. But then the better argument would apply to his theory and commit him to 
Baker’s claim about incoherence.
Are there any reasons that speak against replacing being for with intention? I 
think the fact that identifying moral belief with intention allows one (via the better 
argument) to derive Baker’s claim (which is intuitively false) is itself a reason not to 
identify moral belief with intention.
Another reason against the identification with intention is that if the belief that t 
is wrong were the intention to blame for t, then the belief that one ought to blame for 
t would require (via Enkrasia) to believe that t is wrong. This does not sound correct 
to me in general. It seems rationally fine to believe that blaming for t is the thing one 
15 A reviewer rightly emphasizes that just like the attitude of being for is only part of Schroeder’s toy 
expressivist theory, the relation of blaming for is also just a toy example, and not essential to his theory. 
Luckily, nothing in the better argument hinges on the blaming for-relation.
16 This does not mean they are uncontested. Famously, Kolodny (2005) denies that there are any require-
ments of rationality. It is an open question which, if any, requirements of rationality expressivists accept 
or are committed to accepting.
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ought to do even though one does not believe that t is wrong, for instance, because 
one thinks t is not wrong.17
Another consideration that speaks against replacing being for with intention is the 
following. Many think that moral belief provides motivation that is pro tanto. This 
means it can be overridden or outweighted by stronger motivation, perhaps provided 
by some other moral belief, or a belief about what one prudentially ought or ought all 
things considered to do. Desire, and plausibly being for, also provide pro tanto moti-
vation. In contrast, to desire the motivation that is provided by intentions seems rather 
pro toto. The motivational force of an intention seems to be the result of weighing 
the motivational forces of competing desires or other pro-tanto-motivation-providing 
attitudes. This is also supported by the observation that if one intention is stronger 
than some other incompatible one, then we will normally drop the weaker one com-
pletely, which is less frequently the case with desires: we often stick to our desires 
even if they are incompatible and of very different strengths. This suggests that moral 
belief is more desire-like, and hence rather like being for, than like intention.
These considerations suggest that the Schroederian expressivist should not accept 
Belief as Intention.18 In any case, Schroeder can escape the better argument by sim-
ply sticking to his choice of letting being for be the central attitude in his theory.
This brings us to the second problem mentioned above. If being for and inten-
tion are similar in important respects, then perhaps being for is also governed by 
requirements that are structurally similar to those governing intention. Suppose, for 
instance, that the following variation of Enkrasia governs the being for attitude:
Forkrasia: Rationality requires that if one believes one ought ¬ , then one is 
being for ¬.
This principle combined with Schroeder’s Belief as Being For and with the follow-
ing principle (implied by A-type inconsistency)
No Contradictory Being Fors: Rationality requires that if one is being for  , then 
one is not being for ¬.
again entails Baker’s claim.
This version of the better argument has two premises that are actually accepted by 
Schroeder, namely Belief as Being For and No Contradictory Being Fors. However, 
Forkrasia is not part of Schroeder’s theory, at least not an explicit part, and I do not 
think anyone has defended this particular principle.
17 Maybe Allan Gibbard would disagree with me here. He famously proposes to analyse what is morally 
good in terms of which feelings one rationally ought to have. So perhaps he would accept that believing 
one ought to blame for t rationally requires believing that t is wrong.
18 Another reason against identifying believing that something is wrong with intending to blame for it is 
that it is not clear whether it is even possible to intend to blame, if we think of blaming as a certain sort 
of attitude or mental state. The impression that our attitudes, like our beliefs, are not under our control 
in the same way as our actions are, is shared by a number of philosophers such as, for instance, Broome 
(2013, p. 220f.), Hieronymi (2006) and Wedgwood (2017). I thank an anonymous reviewer of this jour-
nal for raising this point.
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But is Forkrasia implicitly accepted by Schroeder? Perhaps this is so. In a short 
paragraph of his book Schroeder investigates the idea of explaining the motiva-
tional character and inconsistency-transmittingness of intentions on the basis of the 
motivational character and inconsistency-transmittingness of the attitude of being 
for. In this context he assumes, though quite hypothetically, that “intending to do 
A ... involves or commits to being for doing A” (Schroeder 2008, p. 101). Call this 
assumption: Intention-For. This bridge-principle, however, together with Enkrasia 
entails Forkrasia. This means that Intention-For, Enkrasia, Belief as Being For, and 
A-type inconsistency jointly entail Baker’s claim. Should we accept this argument?
Since Schroeder accepts Belief as Being For, and A-type inconsistency, this argu-
ment crucially rests on Enkrasia and Intention-For. I have already noted that it is 
unclear if Schroeder’s expressivist accepts Enkrasia or not, but that I assume it for 
the sake of argument.
So what about Intention-For, the view that intention involves or commits to being 
for? Interestingly, there is a very similar thesis accepted by many philosophers of 
mind, namely the thesis that intention involves desire. Kieran Setiya says that it
is a matter of consensus in the philosophy of intention that intending to do A 
entails wanting to do A, in the motivational sense for which the ‘primitive sign 
of wanting is trying to get’ (Anscombe 1963, p. 68). Doubts about this entail-
ment are attributed to ambiguities in ‘desire.’ When I intend to do A reluc-
tantly, from the motive of duty, I may deny that I want to do it, but what I lack 
is ‘appetite’ not ‘volition’ (Setiya 2018).
Most authors understand the notions of ‘wanting’ or ‘desire’ here rather narrowly, as 
they figure, for instance, in discussions of the so-called Humean theory of motiva-
tion.19 The entailment thesis is mostly taken to be intuitively true or defended indi-
rectly by showing that apparent counterexamples to it fail. The only direct argument 
for the entailment I know of is this. If a person has or expresses an intention that she 
is going to do something, it is always appropriate or legitimate to ask that person 
“Why do you want to do that?”20 It seems that the question would not always be 
appropriate, if what it presupposes, namely that one wants something, would not be 
made true by that person’s having an intention. This suggests that it is impossible to 
intend something without wanting or desiring it. This is supposed to justify the view 
that intention entails desire.
In the present context the question is: Does intention also entail being for? 
Answering this is difficult, because we would have to know more about the being for 
19 For an overview on desire see Schroeder (2017). For a list of properties of desires see Audi (1973), or 
more recently, Sinhababu (2017).
 However, some authors in the debate have a very broad conception of the wants or desires that are 
entailed by intentions so that various kinds of non-cognitive or motivational states count as desires (see 
Hyman 2014, p. 84; Tuomela 1977, p. 128). These authors seem to take the true core of the principle that 
intention involves desire to be the following: “someone intends to do something only if he is motivated 
to do it” (Davis 1984, p. 46). But this principle is much weaker than the claim that intention entails the 
particular mental state of desire in the narrow sense. In fact it is so weak as to become philosophically 
uninteresting, because almost everyone agrees that intention involves or is a sort of motivation.
20 See Davis (1984) and Thompson (2008, p. 104).
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attitude in order to answer it. For instance, is it a decidedly moral attitude or not? If 
we think of it as being some sui generis attitude of moral approval, then the entail-
ment does not seem to hold: intending to go swimming does not require that one 
morally approves of swimming.21 If, on the other hand, being for is not a decidedly 
moral attitude, then it could just be the attitude that goes along with our ordinary 
notion of being for something. After all, ‘to be for something’ or ‘to be in favor of 
something’ are familiar English expressions (that contrast with ‘being against’, see 
OED), and it is natural to think of voting as a way of indicating what we are for.
But this ordinary notion of being for something also does not support Intention-
For. Consider the following case. Former Prime Minister Theresa May intended to 
implement Brexit.22 But even if, in some sense of ‘want’, she wanted or was moti-
vated to implement Brexit (because doing so was her political duty or mandate), it 
appears incorrect to describe her as being for Brexit. Famously, she voted Remain, 
and so she was for Britain’s remaining in the EU, not for leaving it. Moreover, if 
May had on some occasion declared that she intends to implement Brexit (perhaps 
by saying ‘I shall implement Brexit’), it may have been appropriate to ask why she 
wants it (she wanted it, because she promised to deliver on the ‘will’ of the British 
people), but it would have been inappropriate to ask her why she is for Brexit, since 
everyone knows she was not for it, and perhaps she would even have voted Remain 
again, if there had been a second referendum.23
Cases like this one cast doubt on the thesis that intention entails being for. For 
this reason, Schroeder’s expressivist should not accept it. I conclude that even the 
better arguments for Baker’s incoherence claim fail. Thereby, Baker’s objection to 
Schroeder’s expressivism is undermined.
5  Conclusion
The main aim of this paper has been to argue against Baker’s claim that it is ration-
ally incoherent to believe that murdering is wrong while believing that one ought 
not blame for murdering. I have done so by arguing that Baker’s original argument 
21 I fully agree with a reviewer that the attitude of being for, as Schroeder thinks of it, cannot be a sui 
generis attitude of moral approval. If it were, then the belief that grass is green (which on Schroeder’s 
proposed analysis is the state of being for proceeding as if grass is green) would also have to count as 
a moral belief, which is absurd. It might be replied that what turns being for blaming for murder into a 
moral belief is not the being for attitude, but the relation of (morally) blaming for something, or it is the 
combination of being for with blaming. I cannot pursue this idea further here.
22 I am of course bracketing conspirational doubts about whether the real-world May really intended or 
only pretended to intend to implement Brexit.
23 A reviewer who agrees with me that being for is most certainly not a sui generis moral attitude of 
approval, also thinks that Schroeder’s attitude of being for is not the attitude that goes along with our 
ordinary notion of being for something. As a reason for this the reviewer cites that Schroeder stipulated 
that his being for attitude can only take (mental) properties as objects, whereas we can ordinarily be for 
taking certain ways of acting. If that is true, then perhaps the Brexit example, and with it all appeals to 
the ordinary meaning of ‘being for something’, will not be able to show that intention does not involve 
being for. But be that as is may, it also does not show that intention involves being for, which is the claim 
a defender of the better argument would have to make plausible.
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for the incoherence rests on false premises, and is thus unsound. I showed that there 
is a better argument available for the incoherence of these beliefs which, however, 
does not apply to Schroeder’s expressivism as the view is currently formulated, and 
there are reasons for Schroeder not to reformulate his view in terms of intention or 
to assume that intention entails being for. I take my arguments to provide inductive 
evidence for the falsity of Baker’s claim. But if Baker’s claim about incoherence is 
false, he cannot object that expressivism is unable to explain the incoherence.
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